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Sad people recognize faces more accurately than happy people (Hills et al., 2011). We
devised four hypotheses for this finding that are tested between in the current study. The
four hypotheses are: (1) sad people engage in more expert processing associated with
face processing; (2) sad people are motivated to be more accurate than happy people
in an attempt to repair their mood; (3) sad people have a defocused attentional strategy
that allows more information about a face to be encoded; and (4) sad people scan
more of the face than happy people leading to more facial features to be encoded. In
Experiment 1, we found that dysphoria (sad mood often associated with depression)
was not correlated with the face-inversion effect (a measure of expert processing)
nor with response times but was correlated with defocused attention and recognition
accuracy. Experiment 2 established that dysphoric participants detected changes made
to more facial features than happy participants. In Experiment 3, using eye-tracking we
found that sad-induced participants sampled more of the face whilst avoiding the eyes.
Experiment 4 showed that sad-induced people demonstrated a smaller own-ethnicity
bias. These results indicate that sad people show different attentional allocation to faces
than happy and neutral people.
Keywords: mood induction, depression, anxiety, face recognition, eye tracking, face-inversion effect, own-
ethnicity bias, own-race bias
INTRODUCTION
Hills et al. (2011) demonstrated that sad participants were more accurate in a face identity
recognition task than happy participants. These authors used a standard old/new recognition
paradigm to demonstrate that induced mood affected participants’ ability to accurately recognize
facial identity. Furthermore, recognition responses of sad participants were associated with more
conscious recollection than that of happy participants. Hills et al. (2011) indicated that the reason
for sad participants being more accurate at face processing is that they processed the faces more
deeply without explaining what this deep processing is. In this study, we aim to explore why sad
people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people by investigating four potential
hypotheses: enhanced expert face processing; increased motivation; defocused attention; and more
diverse face sampling.
Enhanced Configural Processing
Face recognition is an expert human ability (Ellis, 1986) that is based on distinct neural
underpinnings (Haxby et al., 2002). This neural architecture allows for humans to process faces in
an expert manner (e.g., Rossion, 2008). Researchers tend to agree that faces are processed differently
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to objects (Piepers and Robbins, 2012) and have indicated some
form of configural (Tanaka and Farah, 1993) or holistic (Farah
et al., 1998) processing as the expert mechanism employed for
faces (for a review see Maurer et al., 2002). Indeed, Maurer et al.
(2002) distinguish between three forms of configural processing:
processing of the first-order relational information (i.e., the basic
arrangement of a faces); processing of second-order relational
information (i.e., the individual spatial relations between the
features in a face (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Carey, 1992); and
holistic processing, in which the features of a face and their
interrelations are processed as a gestalt whole (e.g., Rossion,
2008)1.
In order to assess whether mood affects the amount of
holistic processing engaged in, Curby et al. (2009) conducted an
experiment in which they measured participants’ performance on
the composite face effect (in which two faces are put together
to create a new face, Young et al., 1987) following positive
and negative mood inductions. The composite-face task is a
hallmark of holistic processing (Gauthier and Bukach, 2007;
Richler et al., 2008) and identification of the faces that make
up the aligned composite is indicative of reduced use of holistic
processing (Hole, 1994). Participants induced into a sad mood
showed reduced holistic processing, whereas happy participants
showed enhanced holistic processing use. Furthermore, Curby
et al. (2012) found a significant positive correlation between self-
reported positive emotional state and holistic processing use (see
also Xie and Zhang, 2015).
While the evidence seems compelling that sad people are
less likely to use holistic processing during face recognition, a
direct test of all three types of configural processing has not
been conducted. The face-inversion effect is often regarded as
the gold standard for measuring expertise in face processing
(Edmonds and Lewis, 2007). Inversion disrupts all three types
of configural processing (first- and second-order relational and
holistic information). Upright faces are typically processed in
an expert manner, whereas inverted faces have their first-order
configuration disrupted and this impacts on face recognition
performance.
Given that configural processing has been linked to expert
face processing, it is reasonable to predict that there should
be a correlation between the amounts of configural processing
engaged in and face recognition accuracy. Furthermore, given
that sad participants show higher face recognition accuracy than
happy participants (Hills et al., 2011), they should engage in
more configural processing than happy participants. Given that
Curby et al. (2012) found that sad mood is negatively related to
holistic processing, we suggest that sad mood causes participants
to engage expertise in two of the three components of configural
1The terms configural and holistic processing have been used interchangeably
by researchers, yet there is evidence that they refer to different processes, given
substantial evidence indicates that expert face processing does not rely on fine-
grained configural information (Hole et al., 2002; Mondloch and Desjarlais, 2010;
for a review see Burton et al., 2015). Indeed, tests of configural processing do not
correlate with other tests of holistic processing strongly (see e.g., Wilhelm et al.,
2010). This is likely due to the lack of consistent definitions of these concepts
(Burton et al., 2015) and the subtle differences in these concepts. For the purpose
of this article, we use the term “configural processing” to refer to the three types of
processing identified by Maurer et al. (2002).
processing (first- or second-order relational processing, rather
than holistic processing), and potentially primarily in first-order
relational processing given the lack of relationship between
second-order relational information and face processing (Hole
et al., 2002). In other words, the difference between the results
of Curby et al. (2012) and of Hills et al. (2011) is due to the
operationalisation of configural coding. In order to measure
engagement of all forms of configural processing, the face-
inversion effect was chosen for the current study.
Motivation
A second hypothesis for why sad people are more accurate at
face recognition stems from evidence that sad people employ
strategies that actively enhance their mood by being more
accurate (Clark and Isen, 1982; Erber and Erber, 1994). Sad mood
has also been associated with increased elaborative processing
and a higher overall recognition of all types of stimuli, compared
to individuals in happy mood (e.g., Derryberry and Tucker,
1994; Schwarz and Clore, 1996; Deldin et al., 2001; Deveney
and Deldin, 2004). Further work on persuasion suggests that
sad people are more likely to process messages deeply in order
not to be persuaded by weak arguments (Mackie and Worth,
1991; Bless et al., 1992). In social judgment tasks, sad participants
tend to be more accurate than other participants (Lewinsohn
et al., 1980). Sad participants tend to be less reliant on using
stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and heuristic information
(Bless et al., 1996; Hertel et al., 2000) in processing faces
(Wyland and Forgas, 2010). This evidence is consistent with the
view that sad participants are more motivated to be accurate
than happy people. This motivation leads sad participants to
process information in a more extensive (Luce et al., 1997) and
time-consuming manner. Such motivation may enhance face
recognition ability and be revealed by longer time to complete
the task (see e.g., Feehan and Enzle, 1991, who have shown that
participants who are intrinsically motivated spend longer on tasks
than those that are not)2.
Defocused Attention
An alternative way to look at why sad participants might perform
differently at a face recognition task, we could look at more
general perceptual and attentional differences associated with sad
mood. Sad people tend to show enhanced memory for perceptual
details, at the expense of the overall picture whereas happy people
tend to focus on the ‘gist,’ rather than on details (Gasper and
Clore, 2002; Huber et al., 2004). This highlights that sad people do
not attend to scenes in the same way as happy people. Focusing on
the details can lead sad participants to perform more accurately
at various memory tasks.
Attentional focus is also known to be affected by mood.
Defocused attention is where attention is broadly focused,
unfocused or unselective (e.g., Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987)
and may lead participants with this attentional set to recall
additional contextual information in addition to the target
information (Meider and Bröder, 2002; Meiser, 2005). Sad people
2Of course, it could be that sadness simply slows processing down and therefore
longer reaction time may not be a sign of motivation but rather slow processing.
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tend to show defocused attention, in which, during word memory
tasks, they are able to recall extra contextual information (such as
the side of a screen the word was presented on and the color of
the frame surrounding the word; von Hecker and Meiser, 2005).
This increased memory for surrounding, extraneous, contextual
information may be linked to deeper, more elaborate encoding.
Defocused attention may have consequences for how faces
are processed. Typically, when people look at faces, they fixate
on the center of the face (Hsiao and Cottrell, 2008). Defocused
attention causes extraneous information to the core task to be
attended to and potentially stored. In face processing, this might
mean that the face identity might be stored with a stronger
link to facial expression and other contextual information,
such as where the face was encountered, hair styles, jewelry,
and other features of a face that are not usually attended
to. Defocused attention might lead to elaborative encoding of
any extraneous information to the facial identity rather than
restrictive focus on the identity. This elaborative encoding might
lead to deeper encoding of the expression or jewelry which
would typically not be attended to. Moreover, attending to
more of the face may mean that more features of the face are
actively encoded. Given that only a limited range of features
are usually viewed when looking at faces (e.g., Althoff and
Cohen, 1999), this may suggest a more detailed representation
of the face to be stored in memory. Such additional detail stored
may lead to enhanced recognition accuracy. The consequence
of defocused attention leading to more facial features being
viewed is that the processing of certain types of faces might be
altered.
When viewing faces, participants tend to use the most
diagnostic features (e.g., Ellis et al., 1975). Hills and Lewis
(2006) have indicated that attending to the most diagnostic
facial features for the current faces being viewed can lead to
increased recognition accuracy. The most diagnostic features for
faces varies with facial ethnicity as evidenced from physiognomic
variability and eye movement scan patterns. Shepherd and
Deregowski (1981) have found greater physiognomic variability
for the nose of Black faces than for White faces, whereas the
eye (specifically color) varies more for White faces than Black
faces. Eye-movement data confirm that participants attend to the
most diagnostic features for faces they typically encounter: White
participants focus on the eyes when viewing faces (Althoff and
Cohen, 1999; Hills et al., 2012). Shorter fixations are made to the
remaining internal features with very few fixations to the external
features (e.g., Stacey et al., 2005; Hills et al., 2013) leading to the
typical triangular scanpath when viewing faces (Yarbus, 1969).
East Asian and Black participants tend to focus more on the
nose (Blais et al., 2008; Caldara et al., 2010; Hills and Pake, 2013;
Miellet et al., 2013). Participants can be made to show enhanced
recognition of other-ethnicity faces if their attention is directed
to the most diagnostic features for those faces (Hills and Lewis,
2006). Specifically, attending to the nose in Black faces leads to
increased recognition of Black faces in both Black and White
participants (Hills and Lewis, 2011a). The consequence of this
argument is that if sad people are attending to more facial features
than happy people as indicated by defocused attention, they may
well show a smaller own-ethnicity bias.
More Diverse Sampling
Depressed individuals avoid eye contact in social situations
(Gotlib, 1982). Hinchliffe et al. (1971) suggested that deviation
away from the eyes might be extreme, often taking the form of
complete refusal to establish or maintain eye contact. Participants
induced into a sad mood also avoid eye contact (Natale, 1977).
We therefore suggest that eye contact avoidance is a property
of mood. Given this, sad people may look to other features in
order to recognize faces. Indeed, Hills and Lewis (2011b) have
shown that sad people can detect changes made to the head shape
and nose of faces better than the eyes, whereas happy people
show the opposite pattern. This result indicates that mood affects
which features are encoded during face recognition. However,
eye-tracking results are necessary to confirm this interpretation.
It is well established that the eyes are the most critical feature
of faces for recognition for White participants (Haig, 1986a,b;
Gosselin and Schyns, 2001; Schyns et al., 2002; Gold et al., 2004;
Vinette et al., 2004) as evidenced by event-related potentials that
selectively respond to the eyes (Eimer, 1998) and eye-tracking
data showing that the eyes attract more and longer fixations
and greater scanning than any other feature (e.g., Walker-Smith
et al., 1977; Althoff and Cohen, 1999; Henderson et al., 2001).
Ineffective encoding of the eye region holds potential as a link
to overall poor recognition of White faces, as it is commonly
acknowledged that the eyes have an essential role as the primary
focus of an observer’s attention (Hood et al., 2003).
Wu et al. (2012) demonstrated that, during a facial expression
recognition task, dysphoric individuals fixated less on the eyes
and more on the nose than happier participants. This suggests
that sad participants will look at different features to happy
participants. In a face identity recognition task, we might
initially believe that this should lead to poorer face recognition
performance because eye fixation appears to correlate with face
recognition accuracy (Hills et al., 2013), it is possible that sad
participants actively encode the other features and this may
therefore lead to increased face recognition accuracy. We would
expect to find eye movement differences when viewing faces
between happy and sad participants.
The Role of Anxiety
While we have presented a number of hypotheses as to why
depression, dysphoria, and sadness might affect face recognition,
we must not discount the often comorbid (Hirschfeld, 2001)
condition of anxiety. While both are associated with emotional
disturbances (including eating and sleep disturbances), there
are differences between these disorders (such as dysphoria,
feelings of worthlessness in depression and feelings of worry
and trembling in anxiety). Similar to individuals suffering from
depression, clinically anxious individuals show a predisposition
for withdrawal from social situations (Öhman, 1986) including
an avoidance of making eye contact (Gotlib, 1982).
Individuals exhibiting depression and anxiety disorders have
a tendency to scan their environment for signs of impending
negative evaluation (Mogg and Bradley, 2002). This could be
scanning for a face displaying a critical expression (Lundh and
Ost, 1996; Mogg et al., 2000, 2004; Rinck and Becker, 2005;
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Leyman et al., 2007). Consequently, these individuals develop
avoidance strategies in social situations. This could manifest
itself through the reduction of conversational eye contact. Eye-
contact avoidance can lead to interpersonal dysfunctions (Greist,
1995). In eye movement studies, socially anxious individuals pay
less attention to the eye region in comparison to non-socially
anxious individuals, spending half as much time exploring the
eyes (Horley et al., 2004). Social anxiety is also negatively related
to the accuracy with which faces are recognized (Davis et al.,
2011). This provides evidence that anxiety may play a role in any
relationship between mood and face recognition.
While we might consider that anxiety may play a role in
linking depression to face recognition, we must be careful not
to conflate depression and sadness, since depression is a clinical
disorder involving persistent sad mood, feelings of worthless,
and a lack of energy whereas sad mood is a temporary affective
state. There is limited evidence that sadness and anxiety are
comorbid (e.g., Hesse and Spies, 1994). However, there is
evidence that shyness (being nervous in the company of others;
a common feature of clinical anxiety) is associated with eye
contact avoidance (Iizuka, 1994) similar to that observed for
sadness. Those with non-clinical social anxiety also tend to show
eye contact avoidance (Farabee et al., 1993). This suggests that
some effects of sad mood on face perception relate to a similar
mechanism in anxiety, potentially relating to the way in which
features are sampled but differences in the depth that they are
processed (since sadness is associated with deep processing and
anxiety is typically associated with avoidance). In this study, we
will address whether the effects of sad mood on face perception
are similar to the effects of anxiety (in Experiments 2 and 3).
The Present Experiment
In light of the background, we aim to understand why sad
people show enhanced face recognition performance relative to
happy people. We conducted four experiments to test between
the various hypotheses presented above and extend the effect
to explore its limits. In Experiment 1, we first aim to replicate
the findings that mood is associated with face recognition
accuracy and test between the first three presented hypotheses:
that of enhanced configural processing measured using the face-
inversion effect, enhanced motivation, and increased defocused
attention. In Experiments 2 and 3, we extend the findings
from Experiment 1 and use behavioral and eye-tracking tests
to confirm the hypothesis derived from the first experiment.
Experiment 4 replicates the findings of Experiment 3 using
a different paradigm and in this experiment we test how
anger might affect face recognition. In some of the following
experiments we used mood induction and in others we measured
mood (using measures of depression). Mood induction alters
the temporary emotional state of the participant to create happy
or sad mood (Hesse and Spies, 1994). Depression is a clinical
disorder associated with sad mood, lack of motivation, and
feelings of worthlessness. Sad mood associated with depression
is often referred to as dysphoria.
Some of the background we have used to justify our
hypotheses have been found in depression and others have
been found in sad-induced participants. While sadness and
depressed mood are distinct constructs with some differential
effects on cognition (see e.g., Niedenthal et al., 1999), we have
no evidence to suggest that they will affect face recognition
differently: nevertheless it is important to explore mood
induction, naturally occurring mood (sadness) and dysphoria
to fully understand how mood affects cognition. While we
used questionnaires measuring symptoms of depression, we
were not measuring depression and therefore use the term
“dysphoria” from this point forward (similar to Niedenthal
et al., 1999; Koster et al., 2005). Therefore, we wanted to
test using induction and mood questionnaires to establish if
the effects we found are specific to temporarily induced sad
mood or dysphoria. In this manuscript, we use the term
sad (or sadness) when discussing mood induction or mood
induced participants and the term dysphoric (or dysphoria)
when discussing naturally occurring moods measured using
questionnaires. Without pre-empting the results greatly, had we
found differences between results in mood-induced participants
and those with naturally occurring moods, we would have
explored these.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this study, we aim to understand the memory advantage
that sad participants tend to have for face recognition. Firstly,
we aim to replicate the finding that mood correlates with face
recognition accuracy. We then try to establish why this might
be. Several hypotheses have been offered: (1) sad people engage
in more configural processing and therefore will show a larger
face-inversion effect than happy people; (2) sad people might
engage in more effortful processing that happier people and this
will be demonstrated through slower reaction times during the
recognition task; (3) sad people show defocused attention (von
Hecker and Meiser, 2005) and (4) sadness leads to increased
attention to more of the face allowing for enhanced featural
coding (but not affecting configural processing) and better
recognition accuracy. We use a correlational design to address
these three hypotheses.
Method
Participants
One-hundred-and-fifty participants aged between 18 and
40 years (mean age = 24.3 years) completed this study. All
participants self-reported that they had normal or corrected
vision. Participants were recruited via various online platforms.
As an incentive to take part, participants were entered into a
prize draw to win a £25 gift voucher.
Design
We employed a correlational design in which we measured
dysphoria using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983), attentional focus utilizing
a source monitoring task of von Hecker and Meiser (2005), and
face recognition performance using the Cambridge Face Memory
Test (CFMT, Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006). As an index of
configural processing, we used the face-inversion effect (Freire
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et al., 2000): This was calculated as the relative difference in
recognition of upright and inverted faces.
Materials and Procedure
After providing informed consent, the participants underwent
three separate tasks presented sequentially: the dysphoria
measure; the attentional focus task, and the face recognition
task. All tasks were completed on a computer displayed onto a
15′′ LCD color monitor, using an in-house JavaScript program.
Participants made their responses on a standard computer
keyboard.
Mood Measure
In order to measure dysphoria, we used the HADS (Zigmond and
Snaith, 1983). This questionnaire has good internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α= 0.78 for depression and 0.81 for anxiety, Bjelland
et al., 2002). In this questionnaire, participants read a series of
16 statements that relate to symptoms of anxiety (e.g., “I get
a sort of frightened feeling like ‘butterflies’ in the stomach”)
and depression (e.g., “I feel as if I am slowed down”). For each
statement, participants selected how much the item represents
their current mood on a scale of 0–3. The scores from the
questions relating to depression symptomology were summed.
A score of over 11 represents concern for depression (only four
participants scored above the cut-off in the present study, and
were already diagnosed with depression). It is widely used in
typical populations for its ease and simplicity of use (Whelan-
Goodinson et al., 2009).
Attentional Focus Test
In order to measure attentional focus, we adapted the source
monitoring task of von Hecker and Meiser (2005). This task
involved three consecutive phases: learning, break, and a source
memory test. In the learning phase, 40 words were presented
sequentially on either the left or right of a black vertical line
in the middle of the screen in a random order. Each word
was presented in Calibri font, size 12, black text on a white
background, surrounded in red or green frames (1 pixel wide).
Half of the words were presented on each side and half of the
words on each side were surrounded by each color frame. Each
word was presented for 3 s with a blank inter-stimulus interval
of 1 s. Participants were instructed to memorize the word and
its position (but the frame color was not mentioned). Upon
completion of the learning phase, participants were instructed to
take a 30 s break.
Following the break, the source memory test began.
Participants viewed 60 words (40 they had seen before and 20 new
words) sequentially in a random order in the center of the screen.
They were asked, for each word, whether they had seen the word
before by clicking the appropriate response on the computer
(“Z” for seen before and “M” for not seen before). The word
was on screen until the participant responded. If the participant
responded with a “yes,” they were then asked what side of the
screen the word was on (left or right) and what color the frame
was (red or green), responding using the appropriate keys (“L” or
“R” and “R” or “G”). The next word was presented immediately
after completion of the questions about the previous word.
All 60 words were chosen at random from the word norm
database of Paivio et al. (1968) and were nouns of between four
and seven letters with between one and four syllables and had a
mean concreteness score of between four and seven. The words
were drawn at random to be either a target or distractor word
and at random to appear on the left or right and with either color
frame.
Attentional focus was calculated subtracting the correct
recognition of information not to be remembered (i.e., the
frame color) from correct answers of the to-be-remembered
information (word and position). A higher score indicates more
focused attention whereas a lower score indicates defocused
attention. This calculation also controls for overall accuracy (von
Hecker and Meiser, 2005).
Face recognition
The face recognition task consisted of a modified version of
the CFMT (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006), employing the
first two stages of the task. After practice trials using cartoon
faces, the CFMT contains two separate blocks. In the first
block, participants were presented with trials following the
same procedure: the same face was presented in the center
of the screen three times for 3 s each in three different
viewpoints (frontal, 3/4 left, and 3/4 right) sequentially. These
images were presented in 7.80 cm wide by 11.35 cm high
and 72 dpi resolution. Once the third image was presented,
there was a 0.5 s inter-stimulus interval. This was followed
by the presentation of three faces side by side. Each face was
5.50 cm wide by 8.00 cm high. One was the target face and
the other two were distractors. Therefore, each trial is a 3-
alternative forced choice procedure. Participants were requested
to select which face they had just seen by keying in the correct
button. After this response, a second test screen appeared
with the same faces but in a different viewpoint. Again, the
participant responded. A third test screen appeared with the
same faces but in the final viewpoint. Again, the participant
responded. This sequence was repeated for each of six target face
identities.
The second block of the CFMT involved participants studying
six unfamiliar faces in frontal views for 20 s. These were presented
in a 2 × 3 grid. Participants were instructed to memorize the
faces. Subsequently, participants’ recognition was tested over the
course of 30 further trials, where one of the six target faces was
selected among two distractors. The viewpoint of the faces was
different to that at learning. Each item was scored as 0 (incorrect)
or 1 (correct). This allows for a maximum score of 48 on this test,
with chance performance of 16 correct answers. The CFMT was
repeated for inverted faces (the order was counterbalanced across
participants).
The images of faces used in this study was selected from
the database held by Stirling University (PICS, 2014): As in
the original CFMT, six identities were used as targets for the
upright and a different six identities (counterbalanced across
participants) were used as targets in the inverted versions. All
faces used within the study were of male individuals aged between
18 and 40 years (mean age 25 years) in order to match the age
of the participants (note identical age range to participants) in
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order to prevent any effects of the own-age bias (Anastasi and
Rhodes, 2005; Hills and Willis, 2016). The images were matched
for lighting, expression, and pose. All images were presented in
grayscale and cropped to exclude hair and clothing as in the
original CFMT.
Recognition accuracy for the upright faces gives an overall
estimation of face recognition skills. Configural processing was
operationalised as the difference between the recognition
accuracy of upright and inverted faces divided by the
overall accuracy level as this relative measure controls for
overall accuracy.
Results and Discussion
For this and all analyses in this paper, we carefully checked
the validity of the data. Any pre-emptive response (defined as
a key press less than 500 ms post stimulus-onset) and any
protracted response (any response lasting longer than 5000 ms)
were removed from all analyses. In no cases did we remove
more than 3% of data and this never varied across conditions.
While four participants scored above the cut-off on the HADS for
depression, we retained their data in the analysis. Removing their
scores did not affect the pattern of significance (but did reduce
the correlation coefficients).
We ran correlations between the variables of interest
(dysphoria; attentional focus; time to complete the task;
face recognition accuracy; configural processing). Firstly, we
found that face recognition accuracy correlated with dysphoria,
r(148) = 0.21, p = 0.009, shown in Figure 1, replicating the
work of Hills et al. (2011). More dysphoric participants were
not more accurate at all tasks than happier ones, given the
lack of correlation between mood and the recognition accuracy
for inverted faces, r(148) = 0.05, p = 0.561. These correlation
coefficients were marginally, but not significantly, different
to each other, Fisher’s r to z = 1.44, p = 0.075 indicating
that dysphoric participants recognition advantage is primarily
for upright faces with which humans tend to employ expert
processing mechanisms for. However, dysphoria did not correlate
with configural processing, as indexed by the face-inversion
effect, r(148)= 0.10, p= 0.247.
In order to assess whether dysphoria correlated with more
engagement with being accurate, we explored the duration with
which the participants completed each trial. We assumed that
the more motivated participants would engage in more effortful
processing to complete the task. This effortful processing, we
assumed, would take longer than less effortful processing. We did
not find a correlation between time taken to complete the task
and dysphoria, r(148)= 0.14, p= 0.099.
Dysphoria did correlate with attentional focus, r(148) = 0.33,
p < 0.001, replicating the work of von Hecker and Meiser (2005)
suggesting that participants who demonstrated higher levels
of depression also demonstrated a more defocused attentional
style. Defocused attention, however, did not correlate with face
recognition accuracy, r(148) = 0.03, p = 0.757, therefore could
not be the cause of sad and dysphoric participants’ impressive face
recognition.
Taken together our results indicate that mood (either
experimentally induced from Hills et al., 2011, or naturally
occurring) is related to face recognition accuracy. However, our
three hypothesized mechanisms for this relationship have not
been supported by the data: More dysphoric people do not engage
in more configural processing than less dysphoric ones; more
dysphoric people do not spend more time on the tasks attempting
to be accurate; and while more dysphoric people show defocused
attention, this attentional set is unrelated to face recognition
performance. Therefore, we must look for another mechanism
(more diverse sampling of features) for why sad people seem to
show superior face recognition ability to happy people. In order
to do this, we utilize a method pioneered by Hills and Lewis
(2011b).
EXPERIMENT 2
Hills and Lewis (2011b) devised a technique to explore which
features are used by participants when they process faces. This
technique allows us to identify whether dysphoric participants
use a more diverse feature sampling strategy. In their study,
participants were required to select which of two faces matched
a previously seen face. The distractor faces differed from the
target face in terms of changes made to various features.
Sad participants were less able to detect changes to the eyes
than happy participants, but were more able to detect changes
to the outer face shape than happy participants. Potentially,
this may indicate that sad participants use different facial
features in order to help them recognize faces. In order to
assess this, we extended the procedure of Hills and Lewis
by exploring participants scoring highly in depressive and
anxious traits in order to establish which features they use in
face recognition. We tested anxious participants in addition
to dysphoric participants’ since anxiety is also associated with
avoiding eye contact (Farabee et al., 1993; Horley et al.,
2004).
Method
Participants
Sixty (39 female) undergraduate and postgraduate students
(aged between 18 and 30 years, mean age = 23.17) at
Bournemouth University participated in this experiment
voluntarily. Participants self-reported that they had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Twenty participants were in
each group (dysphoric, anxious, or control), see Table 1 for
participant details. We recruited participants until each group
had 20 participants in it. Given that participants completed
the questionnaires first (see Procedure), if there were sufficient
participants in one group, then the Experiment was not
continued for further participants in that group.
Design
A 3 × 4 mixed-subjects design was employed with the between-
subjects factor of participant group (dysphoric, anxious, or
control) and the within-subjects factor of feature change (eyes,
mouth, nose, and outer head shape). Feature changes were
distinguished by either enlargement or reduction of the feature
or replacement of the feature entirely. Counterbalancing was
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FIGURE 1 | Scatter plots of the relationship between: dysphoria and face recognition accuracy; dysphoria and inverted face recognition accuracy;
dysphoria and configural processing; dysphoria and time to complete each trial; dysphoria and attentional focus; attentional focus and face
recognition accuracy.
employed such that each target face had an equal number of
appearances for each experimental condition. The type of feature
change and type of facial expression were also counterbalanced
and appeared an equal number of times throughout the
experiment.
Materials
Sixteen prototype faces were constructed using the face-
reconstruction software Faces 3.0 (InterQuestTM). This
computer-based software allows facial construction from a
set of saved features (e.g., head shape, chin shape, eyes, eyebrows,
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TABLE 1 | Details of the participants for Experiment 1: mean (with
standard deviation in parentheses) BDI, STAI, age (years), and gender
ratio (female to male).
Dysphoric Group Anxious Group Control Group
BDI Score 22.85 (6.67) 5.55 (3.03) 3.60 (3.80)
STAI Score 88.35 (6.27) 109.30 (10.92) 55.50 (12.21)
Age 22.30 (2.36) 23.50 (3.47) 23.70 (2.39)
Gender (F:M) 15:5 12:8 12:8
nose, and mouth). Each feature can be adjusted and repositioned,
shrunk, or enlarged in relation to the other features to create
a wide variety of faces. Sixteen (eight female) ethnically White
prototype faces were constructed. This construction allows for
realistic faces to be constructed and for features to be moved
without any disruption to the facial image (through stretching
or morphing) and has been used in previous studies (e.g., Hills
and Lewis, 2006, 2011b). The images were presented in grayscale
on a 13.3′′ screen. While these images were not photographs of
faces, they maintain the important texture, surface reflectance,
and shape information of the faces which are critical to expert
processing of faces (Russell et al., 2007). Full color images
only enhance face recognition if shape and surface reflectance
information is unavailable (Yip and Sinha, 2001). In this case,
we anticipate the images to be of similar quality to photographs
and therefore will produce face-like responses. Each of the 16
prototype faces was constructed from a unique set of facial
features that were not shared by any of the other prototype faces.
Eight modified versions of each prototype face were constructed
by making changes to the eyes, mouth, nose, or outer face (see
Figure 2). Note that the hair style was not changed when the
outer face was changed. The outer face changed the ears and the
chin shape. Each face was given a common one-syllable name
dependent on the sex.
To examine anxiety symptoms within participants, the study
utilized the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983).
The STAI is a 40-item instrument of self-report scales measuring
transient and enduring levels of anxiety. STAI State question
items pertain to examine how the respondent is currently feeling
(e.g., “I feel at ease”), with responses ranging on 5-point scales
from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’. STAI Trait items assess how
respondents generally feel (e.g., “I am a steady person”), with
responses ranging from ‘almost never’ to ‘almost always.’ This
scale is well established as a diagnostic tool in research, with
strong psychometric support and adequate internal consistency
(Stanley et al., 2001; Spielberger and Reheiser, 2004). A cut-off of
around 88–102 indicates anxious individuals (Kaneda and Fujii,
2000; Stanley et al., 2001; Stark et al., 2002).
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al., 1961; Beck
and Steer, 1987) was used to measure depressive symptoms. It
consisted of 21 multiple-choice self-report questions. The BDI
has internal consistency at least α= 0.75 (Richter et al., 1998). We
used a different measure of mood in Experiment 2 to Experiment
1 since there is often a concern in research that correlations
and experimental effects may be a result of the specific measures
used. By using a different measure, it provides more confidence
FIGURE 2 | Example of the stimuli used in Experiment 2 with an
original prototype (A) face with modifications: (B) eyes changed, (C) eyes
replaced, (D) mouth changed, (E) mouth replaced, (F) nose changed, (G)
nose replaced, (H) outer head changed, (I) outer head replaced.
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in the generalisability of these results. Severity of symptoms
ranges from minimal to severe responses (e.g., “I do not feel
sad”; “I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it”). Individuals
respond to the statement that best fits their emotional state
during the past 2 weeks. This instrument is one of the most
widely used psychometric tests for measuring depression severity.
Furthermore, well-grounded research on BDI has inferred that
0–13 on the scale is associated with mild depression (Smarr and
Keefer, 2011), hence the cut-off point within this study was 13.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed the
STAI (Spielberger, 1983) and the BDI (Beck and Steer, 1987)
sequentially. Participants were next allocated to one of three
experimental groups dependent on their overall scores for the two
questionnaires. No participant scored high in both the STAI and
the BDI, therefore we were able to allocate participants to either a
depressed, anxious, or control group. Following this, participants
underwent the face processing task involving a learning phase
followed by a test phase.
Participants began the learning task. Sixteen prototype target
faces were sequentially presented on screen in a randomized
order, with a 150 ms noise mask displayed between each
face. Faces were presented in the dimensions 194 × 238 mm
during this stage. Participants were instructed to learn the
16 face-name pairings. Progression onto the next screen was
response terminated. Following this, the same 16 faces appeared
sequentially for 3000 ms, and a one-syllable name appeared
beneath each face. Between each of the 16 consecutive trials,
a 150 ms random mask noise appeared. Participants were
represented with the 16 prototype faces without the names and
were asked to identify through a two-alternative forced-choice
test which face correctly matched the corresponding name. Faces
were presented in the dimensions 230 × 297.5 mm during this
stage. The two names from which the participants had to choose
from were names which they had previously learnt. Selection of
the two names was achieved by clicking the corresponding keys,
either ‘1’ (name on the left) or ‘2’ (name on the right), which was
response terminated. Feedback was provided to participants. This
task ensured that participants retained a perceptual memory of
each face. Participants reached a mean accuracy level of 94.04%
(anxious participants), 94.06% (control participants), and 88.75%
(dysphoric participants) in this task, which indicated they had
learnt to match all but one name, on average. There were no
differences across participant groups on the face-name learning,
F(2,57)= 1.11, MSE= 0.02, p= 0.337, η2p = 0.04.
After the learning phase, participants were presented with the
test phase: a two-alternative forced-choice test in which two faces
were presented simultaneously, side by side. The face images
were presented with a dimension of 92 × 119 mm in this phase
(the use of different sized images reduces the impact of low-
level picture matching). Each test trial involved only one type of
facial alternation alongside one of the original prototype faces.
Participants were then instructed to identify the face in which
they had originally learnt via the question “Which face is [Bill]?”.
Participants communicated their answer through pressing the
appropriate key: ‘1’, indicating the face on the left, or ‘2’, indicating
the face on the right. Each of the 16 trials were response
terminated. Between each trial was an inter-stimulus interval
random noise mask lasting 150 ms. Each of the 16 trials were
presented in a randomized order, where the correct answer was
randomized to either the left or right side of the screen, with each
participant only viewing each of the 16 prototype faces once.
Results and Discussion
In order to replicate the findings of Hills and Lewis (2011b),
we calculated proportion accuracy of identifying the correct
face across the four conditions of feature change. We first ran
a 3 × 4 mixed-subjects ANOVA with the factors participant
group (high in anxiety symptoms, high in dysphoria, and control)
and type of feature change. The mean accuracy to detect these
changes is presented in Figure 3. Consistent with Hills and Lewis
(2011b), the interaction between participant mood and feature
was significant, F(6,171) = 10.58, MSE = 0.043, p < 0.001, η2p
= 0.27. In order to explore this interaction, we ran a series of
independent-samples t-tests comparing the accuracy of feature
change detection across the different participant groups. We
employed the Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparisons
(α = 0.004). These revealed that control participants detected
changes to the eyes more accurately than dysphoric participants,
t(38) = 3.28, p = 0.002, and anxious participants, t(38) = 5.32,
p < 0.001. Dysphoric and anxious participants detected changes
to the nose, t(38) = 3.32, p = 0.002 and t(38) = 3.52, p = 0.001
respectively, and outer head shape, t(38) = 3.31, p = 0.002 and
t(38)= 3.51, p= 0.001 respectively, more accurately than control
participants. There were no differences in accuracy between sad
and anxious participants (all ps > 0.093).
These results replicate and extend the findings of Hills
and Lewis (2011b) in several important ways. Firstly, we have
established that control participants appear to be attending to
the eyes more than all other internal and external features (Hills
and Lewis, did not test the mouth). Secondly, sad (in this case,
FIGURE 3 | Mean feature change detection accuracy for control,
depressed, and anxious participants split by type of feature. Error bars
show standard error.
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dysphoric) and anxious participants are better at discriminating
changes made to the nose and head shape than the mouth and
eyes. Indeed, they are significantly worse at detecting changes
to the eyes than control participants but significantly greater at
detecting changes made to the nose and head shape than control
participants. These results seem to suggest that sad and anxious
participants are actively avoiding the eyes and are showing a more
defocused attentional style when viewing faces. However, they
do not appear to be using the mouth any more than control
participants suggesting that the mouth may not be a useful feature
for face recognition.
Finally, we have extended the results of Hills and
Lewis (2011b) into naturally occurring moods rather than
experimentally induced ones. This is an important addition as it
demonstrates that the results of Hills and Lewis (2011b) were not
due to demand characteristics. It also suggests that there are not
qualitative differences between artificially induced moods and
naturally occurring ones in their effect on face matching.
In terms of our overall question, these results seem to suggest
that sad and dysphoric people tend to employ a strategy that
encourages encoding of more facial features than would be
typical. Precisely, they are using external features and the nose
more than control participants do. Typically, viewing the external
features does not lead to increased recognition accuracy (e.g.,
Hills et al., 2013). Viewing the nose leads to increased face
recognition accuracy in other-race faces (Hills and Pake, 2013),
but should not have such a large effect in the recognition of own-
race faces given the importance of the eyes in face processing (e.g.,
Eimer, 1998). Focusing on the nose has been linked to enhanced
holistic processing (Schwarzer et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2010)
which may lead to increased recognition accuracy (Van Belle
et al., 2010). Potentially, sad participants are actively processing
all features in order to recognize faces accurately. In order
to confirm this prediction and see if it actually does lead to
greater recognition accuracy, we conducted a third experiment
employing eye-tracking.
EXPERIMENT 3
Our results indicate that psychometrically measured dysphoric
participants are more accurate at face recognition than neutral
participants and this seems to be related to defocused
attention and eye avoidance because dysphoric participants can
discriminate changes made to parts of faces (the nose and
head shape) that control participants are unable to detect.
This may be the result of an atypical scan pattern relative
to those found in control participants when looking at faces.
In order to assess this directly, we employed a recognition
paradigm in which participants’ eye movements were recorded
as they processed faces. Eye-tracking can be used to measure
the focus of attention (Phillips and David, 1994; Leonards
and Scott-Samuel, 2005; Gilchrist and Proske, 2006; Morand
et al., 2010), given that the function of eye-movements is to
move parts of an image to the high-resolution fovea allowing
for critical information to be focused on (Desimone and
Duncan, 1995; Egeth and Yantis, 1997), though there is not a
one-to-one relationship between fixation point and information
encoding.
In contrast to the previous experiments, we used a mood-
induction procedure. We had wanted to show the effects of mood
on face perception that have been found previously (Hills and
Lewis, 2011b; Hills et al., 2011) occur in naturally occurring
moods rather than only in induced moods. Experiments 1 and 2
have shown this. Now we want to further explore the relationship
with mood and face perception and the mood induction
technique is a more flexible technique: In this experiment, we
also wanted to compare sad mood with happy mood as this is
an element missing from psychometrically measuring dysphoria
(as in Experiments 1 and 2). Previous research indicates that the
effects of mood on how people view faces occurs irrespective of
whether the mood is naturally occurring or caused by induction
(see Natale, 1977; Gotlib, 1982). We, therefore, chose to use a
mood-induction procedure that would ensure we would get a
sufficient number of happy and sad participants to compare the
effects of mood on eye movements.
In this Experiment, we also wanted to further explore how
anxiety affects how faces are viewed. We demonstrated in
Experiment 2 that anxiety produced similar findings for feature
change detection as sad mood. There is significant comorbidity
between anxiety and depression (Hirschfeld, 2001) but not
significant comorbidity between sad mood and anxiety, therefore,
we used this experiment to further show that the results found in
sadness are not unique to sadness but rather due to a common
issue with anxiety. We predict that sad and anxious participants
should avoid looking at the eyes during the recognition task in
favor of looking at other features.
In this Experiment, we further aimed to assess whether there
was any impact of facial expression on where participants would
look. Therefore, we used four different facial expressions: happy,
sad, neutral, and fearful. We chose these expressions to establish
if any mood-congruent recognition biases occur. We also used
upright and inverted faces in order to see whether mood affected
the amount of configural coding used (although we anticipate a
null finding here, due to the results presented in Experiment 1).
Method
Participants
Sixty (40 female) participants from Anglia Ruskin University
were recruited for this study. All participants self-reported that
they were ethnically White and had normal or corrected vision.
Design
We employed a 4 × 4 × 2 mixed-subjects design with the
between-subjects factor of participant mood (happy, sad, anxious,
and neutral) and the within-subjects factors of facial expression
(happy, sad, fearful, and neutral) and facial orientation (upright
and inverted). The dependent variables in this experiment were
face recognition accuracy measured using the Signal Detection
Theory measure d’ and the total fixation duration to each feature.
The presentation order of faces in the learning and test phases was
fully randomized. Faces were counterbalanced across participants
such that they appeared as a target and as a distractor an equal
number of times. Moreover, faces appeared with each expression
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 207
fpsyg-08-00207 February 15, 2017 Time: 13:30 # 11
Hills et al. Explaining How Mood Affects Face Perception
an equal number of times. This study received full ethical
approval from Anglia Ruskin University’s Faculty of Science and
Technology Research Ethics Panel.
Materials
We used the NimStim face (Tottenham et al., 2002); Karolinska
Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist et al., 1998); and
Psychological Image Collection at Stirling (PICS) databases.
These databases contains a series of faces with their expressions
validated by independent observers and are widely used in face
recognition research. These images were cropped to have the
same background and all clothes masked. We employed eight
images of each face: two of each expression – one was used for
learning and the other for test. This helps to minimize pictorial
recognition. These were counterbalanced across participants.
Two-hundred and forty individual face identities were used.
The images were constrained to 506 pixels wide by 764 pixels
high and were presented in grayscale with a high resolution (106
dpi).
All stimuli were displayed on a white background in the
center of a 17′′ (1280 × 1024 pixels) LCD color monitor. The
stimuli were presented and recognition responses were recorded
using E-Prime Profession Version 2 and eye movements were
recorded using a Tobii 1750 eye-tracker (Falls Church, VA,
USA), with embedded infrared cameras with a sampling rate of
50 Hz. The eye-tracker emits near infrared light, which reflects
off a person’s eyes, which is then detected by the eye-tracker’s
camera. A fixation was defined as the eyes remaining in the
same 30 pixel area for at least 100 ms (see Goldinger et al.,
2009). If the eyes left the region, but returned within 100 ms,
it was considered to be the same gaze. These settings were
based on the defaults for the Tobii eye-tracker. Participants’
heads were restrained using a standard chinrest 65 cm from the
monitor.
We used the Visual Analog Scale (VAS: Aiken, 1974)
to measure mood. It consists of a 100 mm line with the
anchor points “extremely positive mood (happy)” at one end
and “extremely negative mood (unhappy)” at the other end.
Participants mark down on the line the point that best reflects
their mood. Mood is therefore operationalised as the point along
the line the participant marked measured in millimeters. The VAS
is a reliable measure of mood (Ahles et al., 1984).
To induce mood, an autobiographical memory task, based on
Hesse and Spies (1994) was used. Participants were told to:
“Write down [the happiest/saddest/most anxiety inducing moment
of your life/your journey to University today]. You have 5 min to
complete this task. Please be as accurate and emotive as possible. Be
assured that your information is completely anonymous.”
Note that the “neutral” induction involved writing about
the participants’ journey to university, therefore meant that the
neutral participants were treated in as similar manner as the other
participants as possible. Participants wrote their memories down
on a plain piece of paper with no identifying information. They
had 5 min to complete this task. These memories were destroyed
at the end of the experiment.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were asked to
complete the VAS to estimate their current mood. Participants’
mood was then induced using the autobiographical memory task.
Once the participants completed the mood induction, they
were positioned in front of the computer monitor with the
keyboard directly in front of them and their head placed
comfortably on a chin rest to keep head movement to a
minimum. Their hand was placed over the relevant keys on
the keyboard in order to minimize movements. Participants’
eyes were then calibrated to the eye-tracker using the in-built
calibration system. This required the participants to track a
moving blue circle around a white background to nine pseudo-
random locations on the screen. From this point, there were three
consecutive phases: the learning phase, distraction, and the test
phase.
In the learning phase, participants were told that they would
see a series of faces and would have to rate each face according
to the question “how easy would this face be to spot in a crowd?”
(a measure of distinctiveness: Light et al., 1979). To make this
rating, participants used a one to seven scale, with the anchor
points “easy to spot in a crowd” (distinctive face) and “difficult to
spot in a crowd” (typical face). Participants were presented with
120 different face identities sequentially in a random order (faces
were split equally among the eight conditions, therefore there
were 15 faces of each type presented). Participants were instructed
to rate the face whilst it was on screen using the numerical
keypad on the computer keyboard. Faces remained on screen for
3 s. Between each face, a random noise mask was presented for
150 ms.
Immediately following this task, the distractor phase began.
This involved participants completing the VAS for their present
mood (i.e., their mood following the mood induction) and
then provide some demographic information (age, gender, place
of birth, and place of residence). Participants’ eyes were then
recalibrated to the eye-tracker using the same procedure as
described above. This phase took roughly 60 s to complete.
Participants then were given the instructions of the standard
old/new recognition test phase: to state, for each face, whether
they had seen it before by pressing the appropriate key on the
keyboard. The keys were “z” for seen before and “m” for not
seen before. Participants were presented with all 240 faces (120
targets and 120 distractors in the same proportion of expression
and orientation as in the learning phase) sequentially and in
a random order. Each trial was response terminated. Between
each presentation a mask of random noise was presented lasting
150 ms.
After the final face was presented, all participants were
instructed to complete the happy mood induction in accordance
with ethical guidelines. Participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
In order to check that the mood induction procedure worked,
we calculated the difference between the participants’ current
mood (collected halfway through the experiment) and their
average mood (collected before the mood induction). A greater
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difference in this indicated a more successful mood induction3.
Mood was significantly affected by induction, F(3,56) = 37.23,
MSE = 29.75, p < 0.001. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests
demonstrated that happy induced participants were happier than
all other participants (all mean differences >9.30, ps < 0.001)
and that sad and anxious induced participants were sadder
than neutral and happy participants (all mean differences >6.02,
ps < 0.023). Numerically, sad induced participants were sadder
than anxious participants (mean difference = 4.57) but not
significantly (p = 0.153). This demonstrates that our mood
induction was effective.
We present the behavioral and eye movement data separately
for clarity. For all comparisons throughout these results, when
Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant, the Huynh and
Feldt (1976) correction was applied. This was chosen since
the sphericity estimates were typically above 0.75 (Girden,
1992). Here, we report the corrected significance levels but the
uncorrected degrees of freedom.
Eye-Tracking
Six areas of interest (AOIs) were mapped out on to each
individual stimulus independently in a similar manner as
Goldinger et al. (2009, see Figure 4). These mapped out areas
were not visible to participants. The areas were based on
theoretically important regions of the face. We analyzed the
duration of fixation in each AOI until the participants’ responded
in both the learning and the recognition phase of the experiment.
Due to the AOIs occupying vastly different amounts of the screen,
we conducted an analysis on area-normalized AOIs (calculated
by dividing the proportion of fixations or durations by the
proportion of the screen the AOI occupied, see Fletcher-Watson
et al., 2008; Bindemann et al., 2009). A value of 1 indicates the
AOI was scanned at chance levels; a value above 1 indicates the
AOI was scanned more frequently than chance levels. The pattern
of results from a non-normalized analysis was identical to that
presented here.
Proportion of time spent fixating in each AOI collapsed across
expression (as expression did not interact with participant mood,
see below) is presented in Figure 5. We analyzed the data using a
4× 4× 2× 6 mixed-subjects ANOVA with the between-subjects
factor of participant mood and within-subjects factors of facial
expression, facial orientation, and feature. Here we present results
relating to our hypotheses for clarity. For the full results, please
contact the correspondence author.
This analysis revealed a main effect of feature,
F(5,280) = 123.75, MSE = 270.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.69
which revealed the standard hierarchy of features: the eyes
and nose were fixated upon more than the mouth, forehead,
chin and cheeks (all ps < 0.001). This effect interacted with
participant mood, F(15,280) = 2.25, MSE = 270.00, p = 0.042,
3Note that this check does not check whether the anxious mood induction
procedure was effective. However, given the mood induction procedure was
effective for sadness, we have no reason to assume it wouldn’t be for anxiety.
Similarly, there were differential effects (see the results) for sad induced and
anxious induced participants indicating that the procedure was effective (despite
there being some similar effects for both sad and anxious induced participants).
η2p = 0.11. Šidák-corrected pairwise comparisons4 revealed that
sad and anxious participants viewed the nose more than the eyes
(ps < 0.01) whereas this difference was not significant for happy
or neutral participants (ps > 0.98). Sad and anxious participants
viewed the eyes less than happy and neutral participants
(ps) < 0.01).
We also replicated the finding that feature viewed interacts
with facial orientation (Barton et al., 2006; Hills et al., 2013),
F(5,280)= 5.79, MSE= 161.28, p= 0.004, η2p = 0.09: In inverted
faces, the nose received greater fixation than the eyes (p< 0.001),
but there was no difference in fixation to these features when
viewing upright faces (p > 0.52).
Recognition Accuracy
The recognition accuracy measure, d′, was calculated using the
Macmillan and Creelman (2005) method. d′ combines hit rate
and false alarm rate according to the formula:
d′ = z(Hitrate)− z(Falsealarmrate)
For this Experiment, d′ ranges from 0 to 3.67, whereby 0 is
recognition at chance levels and 3.67 is recognition performance
with zero errors5. The trend of these data, summarized in
Figure 6, replicates that of Hills et al. (2011).
Replicating Hills et al. (2011), we found a main effect of
participant mood, F(3,56) = 5.25, MSE = 1.98, p = 0.003, η2p
= 0.22. Šidák-corrected pairwise comparisons demonstrated that
sad participants were significantly more accurate than happy
(p = 0.004) and neutral (p = 0.012) participants, but not than
anxious participants (p = 0.193). This main effect interacted
4The Šidák correction were more appropriate for this analysis than the Bonferroni
correction because the number of comparisons makes the Bonferroni correction
prohibitively conservative and unnecessarily increases the risk of a Type II Error
(see Field, 2010).
5d′ can range to infinity in experiments with more stimuli, but for the number of
stimuli used in the present experiment, 3.67 was the maximum value.
FIGURE 4 | An example stimulus with the AOIs mapped onto it: (1)
Eyes; (2) nose; (3) mouth; (4) forehead; (5) chin and cheeks; and (6) the
rest of the screen. AOIs were not visible to the participants.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 207
fpsyg-08-00207 February 15, 2017 Time: 13:30 # 13
Hills et al. Explaining How Mood Affects Face Perception
FIGURE 5 | Area-normalized time spent fixating in each AOI split by facial orientation and mood of participant.
with facial expression, F(9,168) = 3.83, MSE = 0.22, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.17. While no simple effects were significant (all ps> 0.05),
the pattern suggested that sad, neutral, and anxious participants
recognized all faces equally, whereas happy participants had an
advantage for recognizing happy faces.
While we found the standard face-inversion effect, in
which upright faces (M = 1.66, SE = 0.08) were recognized
more accurately than inverted faces (M = 1.32, SE = 0.07),
F(1,56) = 27.14, MSE = 0.52, p < 0001, η2p = 0.33, we did not
find that mood interacted with facial orientation, F(3,56) = 1.98,
MSE = 0.52, p = 0.127, η2p = 0.10, replicating Experiment 1.
This indicates that mood did not affect the amount of configural
encoding engaged in. However, facial orientation did interact
with expression, F(3,168) = 4.35, MSE = 0.20, p = 0.006, η2p
= 0.07. When viewing fearful faces, there was no FIE (p > 0.98),
however, the FIE was significant when viewing all other types of
faces (ps< 0.05). This final result indicates the primal importance
of fearful expressions. The facial recognition system is finely
tuned for rapid detection of threatening stimuli (Mogg and
Bradley, 1998, 2002) and fearful expressions represent threat
(though not of the stimuli itself but of something else nearby).
The expression is basic enough that it is processed accurately and
quickly using expert and non-expert processing.
Taken together, the results from Experiment 3 indicate that
sad participants are more accurate at face recognition than happy
participants, consistent with Experiment 1. They also show an
eye-movement pattern in which they tend to avoid looking at
the eyes, spending more time viewing the nose and mouth than
happy participants do. The consequence of avoiding looking at
the eyes leads sad participants to process other facial features
more deeply. These results are consistent with Experiment 2.
While the anxious participants also avoid looking at the eyes,
we did not find convincing evidence that they were scanning
other features. This, therefore, indicates a difference between
sadness and anxiety: sadness involves processing other facial
features, whereas anxiety simply involves avoiding the eyes. This
extra processing in sad participants thereotically leads to greater
recognition accuracy.
EXPERIMENT 4
The results presented thus far indicate that sad and dysphoric
participants are more accurate at face recognition tasks than
happy and neutral participants. The results are consistent with
a pattern of facial sampling that suggests sad participants
are viewing more features of a face than happy participants
do. Certain features are more diagnostic in the recognition
of faces than others (e.g., Vinette et al., 2004). However, the
most diagnostic features for faces of different races are not
the same (Ellis et al., 1975). If sad participants look at more
features of a face than happy participants, it is highly likely
that they will sample features that are more diagnostic in
the recognition of other-ethnicity faces (see e.g., Hills and
Lewis, 2006). This would lead them to be less susceptible
to the own-ethnicity bias. Johnson and Fredrickson (2005)
have found that happy moods reduced the own-ethnicity bias
relative to neutral and fearful participants. We, therefore,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 207
fpsyg-08-00207 February 15, 2017 Time: 13:30 # 14
Hills et al. Explaining How Mood Affects Face Perception
FIGURE 6 | Mean recognition accuracy for happy, sad, fearful, and neutral upright and inverted faces split by participant mood. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
anticipate that both sad and happy participants would show
a reduced own-ethnicity bias, but that sad participants would
be more accurate overall at face recognition than happy
participants.
Method
Participants and Materials
Sixty (40 female) ethnically White undergraduate students from
Anglia Ruskin University aged between 18 and 50 years of age
participated in this experiment as a partial fulfillment of a course
requirement. All participants self-reported that they had normal
or corrected vision. We used 40 (20 ethnically Black or Asian)6
face identities from the NimStim database used in Experiment 3.
All stimuli were presented in the same way as in Experiment 3
and the same eye-tracking equipment was used.
Design and Procedure
We employed a 4 × 4 × 2 mixed-subjects design with the
between-subjects factor of participant mood (happy, sad, anxious,
and neutral) and the within-subjects factors of facial expression
(happy, sad, fearful, and neutral) and facial ethnicity (own- and
6In preliminary analyses, we did not find any differences in any dependent
measures across Black and Asian faces, therefore these were combined to form an
other-ethnicity group for our White participants.
other-ethnicity). All other aspects of the design and procedure
were the same as in Experiment 3. This study received full ethical
approval from the Science and Technology Research Ethics Panel
at Anglia Ruskin University.
Results and Discussion
The data treatment and presentation followed the same structure
as that of Experiment 3. The mood induction was successful,
F(3,56) = 31.82, MSE = 31.99, p < 0.001. Bonferroni-corrected
post hoc tests demonstrated that happy induced participants were
happier than all other participants (all ps < 0.001) and that sad
and anxious induced participants were sadder than neutral and
happy participants (all ps < 0.001). Numerically, sad induced
participants were sadder than anxious induced participants
(p = 0.154). This demonstrates that our mood induction was
effective.
Eye-Tracking
The eye-tracking analysis was performed in a similar manner
to Experiment 3. Mean proportion of time spent fixating in
each AOI is presented in Figure 7. This figure collapsed across
expression (as expression did not interact with participant mood,
see below). A 4 × 4 × 2 × 6 mixed-subjects ANOVA with the
between-subjects factor of participant mood and within-subjects
factors of facial expression, facial ethnicity, and feature. This
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FIGURE 7 | Area-normalized time spent fixating in each AOI split by face ethnicity and mood of participant.
analysis revealed a main effect of feature, F(5,280) = 180.00,
MSE = 679.79, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.76 that revealed the standard
hierarchy of features: the eyes and nose were fixated upon more
than the mouth, forehead, chin and cheeks (all ps < 0.001).
This effect interacted with participant mood, F(15,280) = 5.57,
MSE = 679.79, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23. Šidák-corrected pairwise
comparisons revealed that sad and anxious participants viewed
the nose more than the eyes (ps < 0.01) whereas this difference
was not significant for happy or neutral participants (ps > 0.91).
Sad and anxious participants viewed the eyes less than happy and
neutral participants (ps)< 0.01). Sad participants viewed the nose
more anxious, happy, and neutral participants (all ps < 0.001).
Anxious participants viewed the screen more than sad, happy,
and neutral participants (all ps < 0.05). Facial ethnicity did not
interact with feature, F(15,280)= 2.00, MSE= 258.47, p= 0.147,
η2p = 0.04.
Recognition Accuracy
Mean recognition accuracy, d′, for Experiment 4 is presented
in Figure 8. Replicating Experiment 3, we found a main effect
of participant mood, F(3,56) = 16.08, MSE = 1.16, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.46. Šidák-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that
sad participants were significantly more accurate than happy,
neutral, and anxious participants (all ps< 0.001). This main effect
interacted with facial expression, F(9,168) = 3.94, MSE = 0.25,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17. While no simple effects were significant,
the pattern suggested that sad, neutral, and anxious participants
recognized all faces equally, whereas happy participants had an
advantage for recognizing happy faces.
We found the standard own-ethnicity bias, in which own-
ethnicity faces (M = 1.66, SE = 0.06) were recognized more
accurately than other-ethnicity faces (M = 1.37, SE = 0.06),
F(1,56) = 22.75, MSE = 0.46, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29. As
hypothesized, we found that mood interacted with ethnicity of
the face, F(3,56) = 2.86, MSE = 0.46, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.13.
Šidák-corrected pairwise comparisons were used to explore this
interaction. We found a significant own-ethnicity bias in our
neutral, t(14) = 2.91, p = 0.011, and anxious participants,
t(14) = 4.71, p < 0.001, but not in our happy participants,
t(14) = 0.83, p = 0.42, consistent with Johnson and Fredrickson
(2005), nor our sad participants, t(14) = 1.34, p = 0.202,
consistent with our hypothesis.
The results from Experiment 4 confirm the findings from
Experiment 3: sad participants sample more of a face than happy
participants. Due to sad participants sampling more of the face,
they sample facial features that are diagnostic in the recognition
of other-ethnicity faces. This means that they are able to code
faces of other-ethnicities in a manner that is more suitable for
those faces and therefore reduces the magnitude of their own-
ethnicity bias. While the anxious participants in this experiment
viewed the eyes less than the happy and neutral participants,
they did not view other features more so than those participants,
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FIGURE 8 | Mean recognition accuracy for happy, sad, fearful, and neutral own- and other-ethnicity faces split by participant mood. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
consistent with Experiment 3. In fact, they viewed the screen
(rather than the face) more than other participants, indicating an
avoidant strategy in this task.
In this experiment, we found that both sad and happy
participants showed a reduced own-ethnicity bias. The reasons
for the reduced own-ethnicity bias is likely to be different in
both groups given that there were no appreciable eye movement
differences between the happy and neutral participants.
Potentially we did not have sufficient power to find that
happy participants would be more accurate than the neutral
participants in recognizing other-ethnicity faces. Nevertheless,
we hypothesize that these two effects are based on different
mechanisms. Johnson and Fredrickson (2005) indicate that
happy participants have a more inclusive thought process
(Fredrickson, 2001). This effect, these authors assume, leads to
enhanced holistic processing which improves the recognition
of other-ethnicity faces (but has no effect on the recognition
of own-ethnicity faces according to them). We believe that the
effect reported by Johnson and Fredrickson (2005) is related
to the fact that happy participants used more inclusive social
categorisation strategies (Isen et al., 1992; Dovidio et al., 1995).
By having a more inclusive in-group, other-ethnicity faces
may be attended to more and this leads to enhanced accuracy
(Hugenberg et al., 2007). We believe that what drives sad
participants to show a reduced own-ethnicity bias is a differential
scanning strategy whilst viewing faces as borne out by our
data and the fact that sad participants do not show enhanced
configural (Experiment 1) nor holistic (Curby et al., 2012)
processing.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We aimed to explore why sad people show a memory advantage
for faces (Hills et al., 2011). In Experiment 1, we established
that dysphoria was correlated with face recognition accuracy
and defocused attention. However, defocused attention was
not correlated with face recognition accuracy. Dysphoria was
not correlated with effort nor configural processing. From
this, we assumed that mood affected face perception through
an alternative attentional mechanism that we hadn’t tested.
Therefore, we explored whether mood affected which features
were used when processing faces. Using a paradigm borrowed
from Hills and Lewis (2011b), we replicated the finding that
sad participant’s detected changes made to the head shape and
the nose more accurately than control participants but did not
detect changes made to the eyes as well. We extended the original
finding by demonstrating a highly similar pattern in anxious
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participants. Furthermore, we demonstrated that sad, anxious,
and control participants used the mouth an equal amount.
Taken together, these findings suggest that sad and anxious
participants might be showing more defocused attention and
looking at different parts of the face, but they are still showing
a feature hierarchy in which the mouth is not diagnostic to
recognition.
In Experiment 3, we used eye-tracking during a face
recognition procedure in order to verify that mood affected the
way in which features were sampled. Our results clearly show
that participants induced into sad or anxious moods did not
look at the eyes as much as happy or control participants. Mood
did not interact with facial orientation. Taken together, these
results indicate that sad mood is not related to the amount
of configural processing engaged in. Rather, mood is related
to a pattern of eye movements over a face in which features
other than the eyes are processed more deeply. We assumed
that this would cause participants to sample parts of the face
that are more diagnostic in the recognition of other-ethnicity
faces. This logic is derived from the fact that certain facial
features are more diagnostic in certain categories of faces: eye
color is diagnostic for White faces, whereas the nose is relatively
more diagnostic for Black faces (Ellis et al., 1975; Shepherd
and Deregowski, 1981). If sad participants use features other
than the eyes for recognition, then they may show a reduced
own-ethnicity bias. In Experiment 4, we found precisely this
pattern.
All together, these results are entirely consistent with a model
of mood affecting face recognition through altering the way faces
are scanned and what information is extracted. This may be
a result of defocused attention, or more plausibly, a result of
the desire not to make eye contact, while remaining motivated
to be accurate (given that there is substantial evidence for sad
participants to be motivated to process information deeply, Bless
et al., 1990; Bodenhausen, 1993; Martin et al., 1993). Anxious
participants do not have this motivation to be accurate and
therefore avoid looking at the diagnostic features. If the faces
are scanned in an appropriate manner, sad participants will
demonstrate increased recognition accuracy relative to happy
participants. Crucially, this is a result of participants engaging
with the faces during the learning task, because we have
previously demonstrated that this pattern of recognition occurs
when the learning is incidental rather than intentional. When
the learning is intentional, mood does not affect recognition
performance (Jermann et al., 2008; see also Hills et al., 2011,
Experiment 3) or produces the opposite effects (Xie and
Zhang, 2015). In intentional learning, all participants have
enhanced motivation to process faces accurately: sad participants’
enhanced motivation to be accurate does not enhance their
accuracy above that of participants in other moods. Therefore,
the effect of sad mood enhancing face recognition accuracy
will only occur under incidental learning conditions as the
mood is leading to enhanced motivation rather than the task
constraints.
While we have consistently found the present set of results
and can explain these results in a simple framework based
around information input, some of the findings we have reported
here are inconsistent with findings from other authors. Xie
and Zhang (2015) reported that mood was associated with
holistic processing measured by the composite face effect.
Scores on the composite face task do not correlate strongly
with measures of configural processing such as the face-
inversion effect (Herzmann et al., 2010). While there are
no consistently agreed definitions of holistic and configural
processing, three components of configural processing have been
identified (Maurer et al., 2002). The first is processing the
overall configuration of a face. This part of configural processing
is necessary to engage the subsequent expert face processing
mechanisms. Second-order relational information processing
and holistic processing can be engaged when the first-order
configural matches a face. Holistic processing, in which faces
are processed as a whole (Burton et al., 2015), is likely to
be the expert face processing mechanism. Inversion disrupts
all three parts of configural processing, whereas the composite
face effect only measures holistic processing. Therefore, the lack
of consistency between Xie and Zhang’s (2015) findings and
ours is not a surprise. Furthermore, the amount of holistic
processing engaged in does not typically correlate with face
recognition accuracy (Konar et al., 2010), therefore we would
not expect to find the strong correlations found by Xie and
Zhang (2015). A final reason for the difference refers to the
difference in testing: implicit memory is affected by mood in the
way we have described but explicit memory is not (Hills et al.,
2011).
Our results have an implication in the way that the effects
of mood are considered. While many researchers consider
the effect of mood to be a social and interpersonal one,
we have demonstrated that mood affects eye movements and
therefore the input of information into the cognitive system.
This therefore means that mood may affect the entire cognitive
system and potentially some of the higher level effects of
mood may actually be the result of low level perceptual
systems.
In sum, we have found that mood affects eye movements
when looking at faces. Sad mood and anxiety cause participants
to avoid looking at the eyes. This causes sad participants to
sample other features. Because sad participants appear to show
an adaptive response where they attempt to repair their mood
by being accurate (Bless et al., 1992; Bodenhausen, 1993; Martin
et al., 1993), they code faces more deeply than is typical,
by sampling additional features, and this leads to improved
face recognition abilities. Therefore, the memory advantage for
faces that sad people show is due to an unusual allocation of
attention.
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